Tag: listed banks

Spain’s Listed Banks Recorded Proceeds Of €10,700M From House Sales In 2016

9 February 2017 – Expansión

Last year, Spain’s listed banks recorded revenues amounting to €10,700 million from the sale of properties. Sabadell was the most active entity, generating €2,691 million from such operations, representing an annual increase of 50%.

Santander sold assets for €2,066 million, in line with the revenues it recorded from this activity in 2015 (€2,070 million), whilst Popular’s turnover from these sales amounted to €2,024 million.

Below the €2,000 million mark, BBVA sold properties for €1,971 million and CaixaBank for €1,337 million. Bankia and Bankinter, which were less active, recorded revenues of €481 million and €135 million, respectively, from property sales.

Losses

Overall, these entities recorded combined losses in their real estate businesses of €6,132 million last year, up by 54% compared to the previous year, when their combined losses amounted to €3,973 million. These figures do not include Bankia, which does not disclose the break down of the results of its real estate activity in its income statement.

Popular recorded the greatest losses (€3,178 million), whereby tripling its losses from 2015. The second largest loss maker was CaixaBank (€1,125 million), although it followed a downwards trend, down by 6% YoY. Sabadell closed the year with losses of €908 million, up by 7.6% compared to the previous year, whilst BBVA recorded 20% higher losses, at €595 million. Santander reduced its real estate losses by 22%, to €326 million.

The clean up carried out by Popular during the final quarter of last year, which generated losses of €2,456 million, combined with those recorded during the first nine months of the year (€721 million) meant that the entity accounted for more than half of the losses recorded by all of the listed banks in their real estate activity. Popular has set in motion plans to create a bad bank, into which it will dump its damaged assets, although the next chapter of the future of that project will not be written until 20 February, when Emilio Saracho takes over as Chairman of the entity.

At the end of December 2016, Popular had recorded real estate provisions amounting to €13,442 million, spread in equal amounts between loans and properties. CaixaBank’s portfolio of foreclosed assets amounted to €6,256 million, following a reduction of €1,003 million. That entity recognised provisions amounting to €656 million last year. BBVA’s losses in its real estate activity include €136 million relating to the reallocation of provisions. Its real estate exposure amounted to €10,307 million, down by 16.8% compared to a year ago.

Original story: Expansión (by Elisa del Pozo)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Bankinter & Popular – Two Sides Of The Same Coin

8 March 2016 – Expansión

The banks’ default rates  are decreasing and their coverage ratios are increasing. Nevertheless, and although the sector is well provisioned in general, experts point out that not all of the entities are in the same boat.

The long awaited publication of the new Circular by the Bank of Spain regarding provisions, which may now be delayed until September, has brought back to the forefront a topic that Spain’s banks were anxious to leave behind: is the cumulative provision level sufficient?

Most of the experts agree that it is, at least in aggregate – overall, Spain’s banks are well provisioned. But there are important nuances, because not all of the entities are in the same situation and we cannot yet completely rule out one-off surprises, which may require further efforts to strengthen balance sheets. (…).

Individual cases

(…) The experts also note that not all of the banks are the same in terms of their default rates and provisions, something that is clear from looking at the delinquency, coverage and foreclosed asset data as at year end. In terms of loan default rates, Popular and Bankinter represent the two sides of the same coin.

The bank chaired by María Dolores Dancausa continues to be the least delinquent, as it has been throughout the crisis. It closed 2015 with a defalut ratio of 4.13%, less than half the sector average.

The entity has properties amounting to just €531 million on its balance sheet and, moreover, together with Bankia, is the only entity that managed to reduce its cumulative stock during the year. On this basis, analysts agree that the relatively low levels of coverage are adequate for its risk profile.

Meanwhile, Popular finds itself at the other end of the spectrum. Its default rate at the end of the year was the highest of all the listed banks, at 12.86%, and its coverage rate was 42.5%, ten points below the average. The bank chaired by Ángel Ron has property amounting to €14,629 million on the balance sheet, exceeded only by BBVA, which has just devoured CatalunyaBanc’s properties (those that were not transferred to Sareb).

In fact, Popular is the bank that analysts cite when warning about possible exceptions to the relative calm on the subject of provisions. In this way, Nuria Álvarez, a banking analyst at Renta 4 says that “we cannot rule out the fact that some entities will still have to make a significant effort, as may be the case of Popular”. (…).

The economist Carmelo Tajadura shares this view, confirming that “Popular is the weakest of the largest six banks”. This expert says that the bank led by Francisco Gómez has made significant efforts to clean up its balance sheet in recent years, but despite that, it still needs to continuing making provisions, without lowering the pace. Tajadura is certain that “Popular has left the worst behind, but it still has a lot to do”. (…).

Popular is very clear that its priority….is to aggressively reduce the volume of non-productive assets on its balance sheet. The bank has set itself the objective of freeing up at least €4,000 million of these assets this year, although some sources raise that figure to €8,000 million (25% of its total stock).

(…). Besides this forecast reduction, announced in its results, Popular is “working on the possible creation of an SPV to which it would transfer between €4,000 million and €5,000 million of assets and then sell a majority stake in that vehicle to institutional investors”.

Problem entities in the wider market

Beyond the large listed banks, the analysts confirm that there are other entities with more problems, including Abanca…because of the quantity of deferred tax assets it has accumulated…”. Other entities flagged as the weakest when it comes to measuring balance sheet quality are Liberbank, Cajamar and BMN.

Original story: Expansión (by Michela Romani)

Translation: Carmel Drake