Large Funds Get Involved in Popular’s Criminal Lawsuit

31 January 2018 – Expansión

The large funds Pimco, Anchorage, Algebris and Cairn are participating in the criminal case that the Spanish High Court is investigating against the former directors of Popular.

These funds, which lost almost €850 million following the resolution of the bank, have appealed the resolution decision taken by the Single Resolution Board (JUR) before the European Court of Justice and the resolution of the Frob before the Spanish High Court. Specifically, Anchorage, Algebris and Ronit have appealed to the European Court of Justice and Pimco, Anchorage, Algebris, Ronit and Cairn have appealed to the Spanish High Court.

On 4 October 2017, judge Fernando Andreu admitted for processing the first lawsuits against the former directors of Popular and PwC. Most of them are focused on the capital increase made in 2016 and against Ángel Ron and his Board for improper management, falsification of documents and misappropriation. Lawsuits have also been filed against Emilio Saracho and the management of the most recent executive team.

The debtholders are being represented in Spain by Andersen Tax & Legal and SLJ Abogados and in the EU by Quinn Emanuel.

Richard East, Managing Partner at Quinn Emanuel, explains: “The plaintiffs filed serious accusations that the Spanish High Court has agreed to investigate. The funds want to be informed and to collaborate in this investigation to determine the existence of falsehoods in the process”.

Original story: Expansión (by Mercedes Serraller)

Translation: Carmel Drake

KKR Finalises Its Purchase Of Hipoges & The Pepper Group

24 October 2017 – Voz Pópuli

The investment giant KKR is multiplying its commitment to Spain. The US fund is on the verge of signing two operations, which will see it obtain real influence in the property and financial sectors. Moreover, it is participating in other major processes to purchase portfolios of banking assets, such as Project Invictus, although Bain Capital is expected to be victorious in that case.

The next operation to be signed in the market is the deal involving Hipoges. And according to financial sources consulted by Vozpópuli, KKR has imposed itself in the sales process of that recovery and real estate asset management platform, which was founded in 2008 by former directors of Lehman Brothers.

KKR’s offer has convinced the vendors – comprising the main directors and the fund Cerberus, which holds a 40% stake – ahead of the bid submitted by the British group Cabot. Sources in the market estimate that the price will amount to €25 million – €30 million in the end.

With the purchase of Hipoges, KKR will be able to compete on equal terms to acquire large portfolios of problem assets from the banks. In this regard, four large funds dominate the market: Blackstone, owner of the platform Anticipa and now Aliseda; Apollo, which controls Altamira; Cerberus, a shareholder of Haya Real Estate; and Lone Star, the main investor in Neinor. KKR is led in Spain by Jesús Olmos and Alejo Vidal-Quadras (pictured above).

Other funds in this league include TPG, which owns 51% of Servihabitat, although it has maintained a rather low profile in recent months; and Oaktree, which manages its assets through Sabal Financial.

What is Hipoges?

Hipoges is one of the main independent servicers, alongside Finsolutia, TDX Indigo and Copernicus. It has 200 employees across four countries and it manages loans and properties worth €8,000 million.

On the other hand, KKR is currently finalising the takeover of the Australian firm, the Pepper Group. That consumer financing institution has a lot of activity in Spain, through 300 employees, and has just made the leap into traditional banking with the acquisition of a small Portuguese entity, which also has a branch in Madrid: Banco Primus. As such, Pepper will soon start to grant mortgages in Spain.

Pepper was one of Banco Popular’s partners, in one of the last alliances to be signed by Ángel Ron; however, it only lasted for a few months until Emilio Saracho broke off the agreement.

The group will be an investee company and so the executives of KKR are not expected to get involved in the management of the company beyond sitting on the Board of Directors of the holding company in Australia. Even so, Vidal-Quadras has participated in the operation to value the business in Spain, and so his opinion will be taken into account when determining the financial entity’s strategy.

Original story: Voz Pópuli (by Jorge Zuloaga)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Santander Engages Morgan Stanley To Execute Express Sale Of Popular’s Property

29 June 2017 – Voz Pópuli

Banco Santander does not want to waste any time with its sale of Popular’s properties. The entity chaired by Ana Botín has engaged Morgan Stanley to execute an express plan to get rid of the problem assets that it has inherited from its subsidiary, according to financial sources consulted by Vozpópuli. Sources at Santander declined to comment.

According to the same sources, the mandate does not outline the sale of specific assets, but rather it defines which would be the best solution: the rapid transfer of assets in large batches; the reactivation of Ángel Ron’s old idea of creating a bad bank (Project Sunrise); the transfer of assets to Testa and Metrovacesa; or taking things more slowly to benefit from the economic recovery.

It is about putting the real estate balance sheet in order and defining the best path for each asset type. But Morgan Stanley’s work, which is being led by its CEO, Juan González Pedrol, will not focus only on resolving Popular’s existing property puzzle. It is also meeting investors to get them to analyse assets and prepare bids.

The fact that Santander has already committed to a mandate of this calibre shows that it is not afraid of reducing the volume of problem assets, which amount to almost €50,000 million after the merger. That is something that investors would penalise in the event that those assets stagnated on the bank’s balance sheet. In that context, a few weeks ago, Botín committed to cutting Popular’s real estate exposure in half by 2019.

The person responsible for this task at Santander is Javier García Carranza, Deputy General Manager of the group and Head of Restructuring, Real Estate, Investments and Venture Capital. García Carranza joined Santander from Morgan Stanley, where he used to be responsible for Real Estate in London.

The mandate given to his former entity is one of the most sought-after in the investment banking sector, alongside the capital increase, from which Morgan Stanley has been ruled out. Names still in the running for that €7,000 million-operation include Citigroup and UBS, as global coordinators, and Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, BBVA, HSBC and CaixaBank, according to Bloomberg (…).

Saracho’s plan suspended

One of the first measures introduced by Santander after it took control of Popular was to suspend the operations that Saracho’s team had set in motion. The former management team had at least two portfolios on the market (…).

Sources in the market expect Santander and Morgan Stanley to bring a large portfolio onto the market before the end of the year, given that there is a lot of demand from large international funds. The clean-up conducted during the merger, of almost €8,000 million, means that the group is ready for these operations.

Following the merger, Santander has accumulated problem assets amounting to €48,417 million, according to the latest official figures. Of those, €36,800 million come from Popular, with a coverage after extraordinary provisions of 66%, and €11,600 million from Santander, which before the merger held a coverage of 57%. That means that the new Santander-Popular entity has more assets than Sareb.

In addition, the group holds other investments, such as its stakes in Metrovacesa, Sareb and Testa Residencial, which, in the case of Santander alone, amount to €5,300 million.

Original story: Voz Pópuli (by Jorge Zuloaga)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Banco Popular Records Losses Of €137M In Q1

8 May 2017 – La Vanguardia

Banco Popular recorded losses of €137 million during the first quarter of 2017, its first set of accounts to be published since Emilio Saracho (pictured above) took the helm. And it is clear that he has not escaped from the fallout of the property sector, the evil that tormented his predecessor Ángel Ron. In fact, the loss in Q1 is primarily explained by a €496 million provision against the entity’s real estate portfolio.

Compared to the previous year, the panorama is completely different. During the first quarter of 2016, Popular recorded a profit of €94 million. The need to clean up and strengthen the balance sheet means that the numbers have gone into the red, but the new provisions increase the coverage ratio to 45.2%, with €570 million in non-performing assets and raise the default rate to 51.4%, according to figures published by the entity on Friday.

The bank is going through a difficult time, it registered losses of almost €3,500 million last year. To stay afloat, on Friday, the entity ruled out selling assets “in an indiscriminate way”, given that it will take the decisions that it considers appropriate “always taking into account the value that may be generated for the shareholders”, according to the bank’s CEO, Ignacio Sánchez-Asiaín.

Popular is looking to sell both WiZink and Totalbank if it receives good offers for them and has said that the bank is holding “advanced conversations” for the sale of its non-strategic assets.

Similarly, the director revealed that Project Sunrise, which had been driven by Ron and which sought to place the entity’s real estate assets into a type of bad bank, has been “completely abandoned”. “If we don’t have to recognise any extraordinary provisions, of course, we expect to generate profits this year”, he added.

Popular lost €800 million in deposits in February due to the relevant events that marked the transformation of the entity and reductions in its rating by the credit rating agencies.

Nevertheless, the bank is “succeeding” in recovering deposits and specified that in this sense there is a monthly volatility, which means that Popular is not “worried” by what has happened over the last few months.

The accounts reflect gains of €180 million in the retail business, where the bank specialises in SMEs. The volume of loans granted decreased by 5.6% to €100,859 million, with a default ratio that rose to 14.91%, compared to 12.68% a year before. (…).

Meanwhile, the real estate activity recorded losses of €317 million. Property sales amounted to €459 million, with an 18.5% increase in retail sales, at the same time as the sale of real estate loans reached €402 million.

As the end of the quarter, the capital ratio amounted to 11.91%, above the requirement of 11.375%.

Original story: La Vanguardia

Translation: Carmel Drake

Popular Abandons Sunrise To Pursue Other RE Solutions

29 March 2017 – Cinco Días

Speculation about the future of Banco Popular has not dissipated following Emilio Saracho’s arrival as the entity’s new President on 20 February, although it is true that it has tempered slightly. The bank’s low solvency ratios, after it completed a major cleanup effort in 2016, are fueling those rumours and it seems that until the entity shows the market that it is capable of resurrecting itself like Ave Fénix, through some kind of major sales operation, then the market will not stop seeing it as an easy target.

Popular’s level of regulatory capital stood at 8.17% in December, below the 10.5% required by the ECB in January 2019 and also below the average for the sector. Most of its capital consumption is due to its high-risk level, itself a consequence of its large property portfolio, the main problem in all of this. However, a substantial number of the solutions designed by the former President, Ángel Ron, have now disappeared or have been modified. (…)

One project that has been buried almost completely, although it has barely been acknowledged that it is not going to be carried out, is Sunrise. That was Ron’s star project, to eliminate a large part of the entity’s real estate portfolio.

The idea was to transfer around €6,000 million in real estate assets to this vehicle, which was going to be deconsolidated from Banco Popular’s balance sheet, after securing a complex financing structure, and its subsequent debut on the stock market.

It seems that Saracho has not approved of that project since he arrived at the bank and has decided to shut it away in a drawer, never opened. Now questions are being asked about what will happen to Remigio Iglesias and Roberto Rey, two executives hired by Popular last year to serve as the President and CEO of Sunrise, respectively.

Another option still open to Popular is to turn to the European bad bank, which the ECB is expected to create, according to market sources. In fact, Popular’s share price was the most bullish on Tuesday, with an increase of 3.24%, after the European Banking Authority said that it was in favour of creating a European bad bank to solve the problematic loan phenomenon, a project that is also supported by the ECB.

Original story: Cinco Días (by Ángeles Gonzalo Alconada)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Popular’s RE Losses €992M Higher Than Expected In 2016

2 March 2017 – Expansión

Popular had to find almost €1,000 million more than it had planned in 2016, to cover over-valued loans and properties, and the impairment of its subsidiary, Targobank.

During its last capital increase, Banco Popular announced that it was going to carry out an upwards adjustment to its provisions of around €4,700 million. Nevertheless, the final figure for the definitive provisions amounted to €5,692 million, which led to a negative result (loss) of €3,485 million. The entity, which was chaired by Ángel Ron at the time, has justified the reasons for that €992 million deviation in its total provisions balance in its recently published annual report.

The largest item in terms of provisions not foreseen in the market by the former managers of Banco Popular was “non-recurring provisions for loans and properties”. In total, around €703 million had to be found, in addition to another €54 million in extra provisions to cover other portfolios of loans and properties on the bank’s balance sheet (in this case on a recurring basis).

The other major item in terms of provisions for impairment, which worsened Popular’s numbers by more than expected, related to its subsidiary, Targobank (the bank that it controls jointly with Crédit Mutuel). The significant losses incurred by the entity in 2016 (it recorded a negative result of €71 million) and its failure to comply with the business plan caused the impairment of 100% of the entity’s goodwill balance, which had amounted to €169 million.

Finally, the bank acknowledges that it also had to add another €66 million to its provision balance in 2016 (and post 100% of the corresponding entry in the income statement for the year) in relation to “pensions, restructuring costs and other items”.

In addition to the unforeseen provision-related items, Banco Popular says in its annual report that the high level of provisions recorded in 2016 is due “to a large extent” to the clean-up procedures that were carried out as a result of the new accounting circular 4/2016, issued by the Bank of Spain, known in the sector as Annex IX, which came into force last autumn.

The majority of the clean-up effort focused on the property portfolio, as well as on loans to sectors linked to real estate. According to information presented in the entity’s accounts, this adjustment translated into an impairment in the value of the real estate assets (in other words, provisions) of around €4,025 million last year. The remaining €1,666 million of the new provisions for bad debts were allocated to cover impairments in the bank’s main business. (…).

Original story: Expansión (by Nicolás M. Sarriés)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Saracho Calls Time On Ron’s Plans For Popular’s Bad Bank

15 February 2017 – El Economista

Project Sunrise, designed by Ángel Ron’s team at Popular to extract €6,000 million worth of real estate assets from the entity’s balance sheet, has run aground. With less than a week to go before Emilio Saracho (pictured above) takes over the presidency, the former global vice-president of JP Morgan has announced that he is not convinced by the plan and has put a stop to it, according to sources.

The vehicle had been approved by the Bank of Spain, but had not yet convinced the Spanish National Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV) or the European Central Bank (ECB). Their aversion to the plan seems to have led Saracho to reject it. Although the star plan to clean up the balance sheet had received support from the bank’s Board of Directors, the difficulties involved in deconsolidating the portfolio of non-performing assets and the potential risks that could result for the future owners of the vehicle, are hampering its execution. (…).

Moreover, the real estate company has also been impeded by a more limited appetite than it had hoped for from the investment banks, whose involvement is key. The plan is for the company to be financed through senior bonds, subscribed to by those investors and subordinated debt, which will constitute the remuneration that the bank will receive from the company in the future. At the time, the entity confirmed that the interest expressed by JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley and Deutsche Bank was sufficient to crystallise the project. But, in order to deconsolidate the real estate company, the senior bond tranche must represent a majority and a low uptake from the investment banks is likely to increase the cost of that bond issue.

Ron acknowledged in his public farewell, alongside the CEO, Pedro Larena, that Project Sunrise has suffered certain changes from its original scope, but that Saracho was aware of these, along with other measures.

During the last quarter of 2016, the entity recognised an additional €3,000 million in non-performing assets and allocated €5,692 million to clean up efforts, rather than €4,700 million, the amount it had planned to set aside when it carried out its €2,500 million capital increase last summer. The effort reflects that recognition of a greater volume of toxic assets and also served to cover the costs of the adjustments to branches and staff, the impact of the floor clauses and the unexpected losses in TargoBank (…). Nevertheless, it was insufficient to reach the goal in terms of doubtful debt coverage and provisions for properties.

Shock therapy

Saracho was reportedly aware of all of this. Nevertheless, the banker will start work without a pre-determined road map (…) on the understanding that the bank needs to define a comprehensive shock plan.

Saracho will conduct a detailed analysis to assess the entity’s viability and to define its new strategy. Ron was committed to making the bank smaller, focusing on its profitable business niche of SMEs in Spain and spinning off its subsidiaries in the USA, Mexico and Portugal, where the interest aroused will ensure a positive return on investment – market sources speculate that the private bank, and even the insurance business, are included in this equation.

The sources consulted also say that these changes, if they are undertaken, would help restore solvency, but would not be sufficient to ensure the bank’s future. After a detailed analysis of the situation, Saracho will have to choose the best option for his shareholders from a handful of scenarios.

If he thinks the entity is viable, it is unlikely that he will undertake another capital increase (…), but may include transferring assets to Socimis or integrating them into real estate companies in which the bank holds a stake.

In the worst case scenario, the new manager faces the option of breaking up the group and selling it off in parts or by asset. And whilst a sale to a competitor or a merger is not unthinkable, a priori, it appears to be the least attractive option for shareholders, given the lack of interest in the sector.

Original story: El Economista (by Eva Contreras and Lourdes Miyar)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Popular Engages Deutsche To Sell RE Assets Worth €4,000M

13 July 2016 – Expansión

Banco Popular has almost oiled the machinery that it will use to remove between €3,500 million and €4,000 million in property from its balance sheet. The entity chaired by Ángel Ron (pictured above) has engaged Deutsche Bank and EY to create a real estate company, which will be opened up to investors, in order to deconsolidate its assets, according to financial sources.

The plans are already well underway, although the complexity involved means that they will probably be delayed until the end of the year.

For the time being, Popular and its two advisors will focus on defining the perimeter of the assets to be transferred to the company and in creating the ideal structure. To this end, the bank will write to Spain’s National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) to obtain the necessary authorisations.

The plan being carried out by the entity is very similar to the one conducted by Santander, and to a lesser extent by BBVA, with Metrovacesa, when it reduced its stake and transferred its assets in order to deconsolidate them from their balance sheets. That forms part of the merger plan with Merlin Properties. Popular also owns a stake in Metrovacesa, and so has followed the process closely.

In theory, all of the assets to be transferred to the new company will be foreclosed: land, homes and work in progress properties. The new company will have its own management team, which will operate independently of the bank chaired by Ron.

Popular owned €16,132 million in foreclosed assets at the end of 2015. Of those, €4,352 million related to finished buildings; €6,685 million was land; €1,436 million comprised homes proceeding from (unpaid) mortgages; €398 million related to buildings under construction; and €3,255 million corresponded to other assets.

Problematic assets

In addition to these foreclosed assets, Popular held doubtful loans to property developers, which took its total exposure to problem assets to €34,000 million, making it the financial group with the largest real estate inheritance in the financial sector at the end of 2015.

That situation movitvated the €2,500 million macro capital increase that the entity completed last month. One of the main objectives was to increase the coverage of the problem assets from its current level of 38% to 50%, in line with the rest of the sector. The low coverage ratio was one of the impediments facing the entity in its efforts to undertake large sales of real estate assets.

The bank’s strategic plan involves reducing the volume of problem assets by €15,000 million between now and 2018, to €19,000 million.

In addition to its large operations, such as the one it is working on with Deutsche Bank and EY, Popular is also promoting the sale of properties through its commercial network and its real estate manager, Aliseda. That company is controlled by Värde Partners and Kennedy Wilson, which together own a 51% stake in the share capital, and Popular, which holds the remaining 49% stake.

Investors

Värde Partners is one of the major investors who will be invited to participate in the company. In addition to Aliseda, the US fund has joined forces with the bank in its credit card business, WiZink, in which it acquired a 51% stake. Värde also recently launched its own property developer, Dospuntos, which has an ambitious investment plan amounting to €2,000 million. Even so, the project will also be opened up to other international and domestic investors.

Original story: Expansión (by Jorge Zuloaga)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Bankinter & Popular – Two Sides Of The Same Coin

8 March 2016 – Expansión

The banks’ default rates  are decreasing and their coverage ratios are increasing. Nevertheless, and although the sector is well provisioned in general, experts point out that not all of the entities are in the same boat.

The long awaited publication of the new Circular by the Bank of Spain regarding provisions, which may now be delayed until September, has brought back to the forefront a topic that Spain’s banks were anxious to leave behind: is the cumulative provision level sufficient?

Most of the experts agree that it is, at least in aggregate – overall, Spain’s banks are well provisioned. But there are important nuances, because not all of the entities are in the same situation and we cannot yet completely rule out one-off surprises, which may require further efforts to strengthen balance sheets. (…).

Individual cases

(…) The experts also note that not all of the banks are the same in terms of their default rates and provisions, something that is clear from looking at the delinquency, coverage and foreclosed asset data as at year end. In terms of loan default rates, Popular and Bankinter represent the two sides of the same coin.

The bank chaired by María Dolores Dancausa continues to be the least delinquent, as it has been throughout the crisis. It closed 2015 with a defalut ratio of 4.13%, less than half the sector average.

The entity has properties amounting to just €531 million on its balance sheet and, moreover, together with Bankia, is the only entity that managed to reduce its cumulative stock during the year. On this basis, analysts agree that the relatively low levels of coverage are adequate for its risk profile.

Meanwhile, Popular finds itself at the other end of the spectrum. Its default rate at the end of the year was the highest of all the listed banks, at 12.86%, and its coverage rate was 42.5%, ten points below the average. The bank chaired by Ángel Ron has property amounting to €14,629 million on the balance sheet, exceeded only by BBVA, which has just devoured CatalunyaBanc’s properties (those that were not transferred to Sareb).

In fact, Popular is the bank that analysts cite when warning about possible exceptions to the relative calm on the subject of provisions. In this way, Nuria Álvarez, a banking analyst at Renta 4 says that “we cannot rule out the fact that some entities will still have to make a significant effort, as may be the case of Popular”. (…).

The economist Carmelo Tajadura shares this view, confirming that “Popular is the weakest of the largest six banks”. This expert says that the bank led by Francisco Gómez has made significant efforts to clean up its balance sheet in recent years, but despite that, it still needs to continuing making provisions, without lowering the pace. Tajadura is certain that “Popular has left the worst behind, but it still has a lot to do”. (…).

Popular is very clear that its priority….is to aggressively reduce the volume of non-productive assets on its balance sheet. The bank has set itself the objective of freeing up at least €4,000 million of these assets this year, although some sources raise that figure to €8,000 million (25% of its total stock).

(…). Besides this forecast reduction, announced in its results, Popular is “working on the possible creation of an SPV to which it would transfer between €4,000 million and €5,000 million of assets and then sell a majority stake in that vehicle to institutional investors”.

Problem entities in the wider market

Beyond the large listed banks, the analysts confirm that there are other entities with more problems, including Abanca…because of the quantity of deferred tax assets it has accumulated…”. Other entities flagged as the weakest when it comes to measuring balance sheet quality are Liberbank, Cajamar and BMN.

Original story: Expansión (by Michela Romani)

Translation: Carmel Drake

Popular Places €1,500M 6-Year Mortgage Bond Issue

26 February 2016 – Cinco Días

Banco Popular has issued €1,500 million in mortgage bonds with a six year term and a price of 88 points above the mid-swap rate. Demand for the bonds has exceeded €2,800 million, according to market sources.

This is the first debt issue that the entity led by Ángel Ron has completed in 2016. Last year, the bank issued debt amounting to €5,050 million in total.

Popular’s most important debt issuances in 2015 included: the issue of senior debt amounting to €500 million, of which 74% was acquired by international investors; €3,000 million in bonds with interest rates that were “historically low” for the entity; and €750 million in Additional Tier 1, which was placed entirely with qualifying international investors within just a few hours.

Original story: Cinco Días

Translation: Carmel Drake